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ABSTRACT 
This paper  discusses the  endeavours of policy makers to come to some degree  of wage  coordination 
among EU countries, aiming at aligning wage growth with labour productivity growth at the national 
levels. In this context, we analyse the wage and productivity developments in Germany, the European 
Union’s periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain along with the US for the period 1980-
2010. Apart from the contribution of productivity to wages, we take into account the contributions of 
prices, unemployment, replacement rates and taxes by means of an econometrically estimated non-linear 
wage equation resulting from a wage bargaining model.  We further study the downward rigidities of 
wages in depth. The findings show that in past times of low productivity, price inflation and reductions in 
unemployment put significant upward pressure on wage growth, also in the low inflationary period of the 
2000s. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are far from aligning wage growth with productivity growth. 
German productivity is a major German wage determinant, but surely not the only one. To steer wages, 
policy makers can effectively use the replacement rate.  
Key words: wages, compensation per employee, unit labour costs, productivity, wage formation, wage 
coordination, labour market, wage flexibility, unemployment, prices, replacement rate, monetary union. 
JEL codes: C22, E5, E6, E24, J30. 
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“The relation between wages and productivity is important because it is a key determinant of the standard of 
living of the employed population as well as of the distribution of income between labour and capital.” 
Martin Feldstein in “Did wages reflect growth in productivity?”, 2008 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Wage developments are not easy to explain. In developed and developing economies private sector wages 
but often also government sector wages are the outcomes of bargaining processes, in which employers 
and employees usually have a say. In addition to this, government policy matters such as alterations in the 
tax rates and social security measures. This makes that the ultimate formation of wages does not give an 
outcome straightforwardly linked to observable determinants. In particular, the direct impact of labour 
productivity on wages has frequently been the topic in the scientific literature and in policy debates. A 
high (low) labour productivity growth justifies a high (low) wage growth, but also other factors play a role 
in the wage negotiation process and push or pull wage growth in most developed economies.  
In the European Union, consisting of 27 countries of which 17 countries2 form an economic and monetary 
union (EMU), there are regularly calls for further integration, in the field of political integration but also in 
the field of economic  coordination. In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, the 
sovereign  debt crisis has  triggered a discussion  on  new fiscal discipline  in which  current account 
developments are not disregarded. Twin deficits, implying a fiscal  and a current account deficit often go 
hand in hand. In this debate, an important factor influencing the current account balances has been put 
higher on the EU agenda: wage coordination. In the absence of a functioning fiscal union where fiscal funds 
can flow from one member country to another in case of asymmetric shocks, wage coordination among 
member states can be an alternative for adjusting adequately to shocks.  
Member states in the monetary union are no longer able to adjust their nominal exchange rate. They can 
therefore only compete with their real exchange rates where the main adjustment mechanism is the unit 
labour cost (wage growth minus productivity growth). A moderate development of wages positively affect 
the current account, in that a lower wage growth is beneficial in terms of international competitiveness 
and therefore will lead to higher exports and thus on current account balances. Oppositely, countries with 
abundant wage growth loose in terms of international competitiveness. Their higher wages translate in 
higher export prices and consequently lower exports of goods and services, and therefore will show a 
deficit on the goods and services balances of the current account. 3 
Following this way of reasoning, a coordination of the wage growth across the  EU countries could partly 
wipe out the imbalances on the current accounts of the individual  countries. Countries with a current 
account surplus in the recent past (Germany, for instance) would have had a lower surplus in case its 
                                                                 
2 The member states of the EMU are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia (since 1 January 2011), Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Spain. 
3 On the systematic divergence of current accounts between countries with surpluses (such as Germany) 
and countries with deficits (Greece, Spain), see chart 4 of Mongelli and Wyplosz (2008) or the discussion 
of charts 5-7 in De Grauwe (2011). Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 4 
 
wage growth had been less moderate, while countries that had a current account deficit in the recent past 
(Greece, for instance) would have had a lower deficit in case its wage growth had been less abundant. As 
the European Union is not a closed economy, a certain degree of current account imbalances will naturally 
remain, even in case of perfect wage coordination. 
Especially for people outside the Europe Union this discussion will be hard to follow. A main question is 
how several economies, with a common monetary policy, with a certain degree of economic co-operation 
but  with  different  economic  structures  could  agree  on  a  common  wage  growth  rate.  Countries  have 
different  unemployment  rates,  differences  in  labour  productivity  growth  and  different  social  security 
systems, and tax rates. Moreover, even in a monetary union, the different member states have different 
levels of inflation. All these macroeconomic factors can affect to some extent the development of wages. 
Only in the extreme case that the national authorities could fix the growth rate of wages, a workable 
coordination  of  wages  across  countries  could  exist.  Although  the  national  authorities  have  a  say  in 
government  wages  and  social  security  benefits,  wages  in  the  private  sector  are  in  most  European 
countries a bargaining process between employers and labourers or labour unions, where the government 
has no legal instruments to interfere. 
To clarify things, we provide here the precise wording of the Council of the European Union on what was 
baptised in popular terms the “competitivity pact”, officially called the “Euro-Plus Pact” or “Pact for the 
euro”. The relevant paragraph of the Council conclusions (see Council of the European Union, 11 and 25 
March 2011) states under the heading foster competitiveness the following:   
“Progress will be assessed on the basis of wage and productivity developments and competitiveness adjustment needs. To 
assess whether wages are evolving in line with productivity, unit labour costs (ULC) will be monitored over a period of 
time, by comparing with developments in other Euro area countries and in the main comparable trading partners. ... 
Large and sustained increases may lead to the erosion of competitiveness, especially if combined with a widening current 
account deficit and declining market shares for exports. Action to raise competitiveness is required in all countries, but 
particular attention will be paid to those facing major challenges in this respect. ... 
Each country will be responsible for the specific policy actions it chooses to foster competitiveness, but the following 
reforms will be given particular attention:   
(i) respecting national traditions of social dialogue and industrial relations, measures to ensure costs developments in 
line with productivity, such as:    
• review the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary, the degree of centralisation in the bargaining 
process,  and  the  indexation  mechanisms,  while  maintaining  the  autonomy  of  the  social  partners  in  the  collective 
bargaining process;  
• ensure that wages settlements in the public sector support the competitiveness efforts in the private sector 
(bearing in mind the important signalling effect of public sector wages).  ...” 
Close reading of these quotes tells us that wage growth should evolve in line with the growth rate of 
labour productivity at the national level. As labour productivity growth across countries may diverge, also 
wage growth across countries diverges. However, wage growth should be conducive for competitiveness, 
in that large and sustained increases should not occur unless productivity growth is high. Noteworthy is 
further that nominal instead of real wages are the focal point. Price compensation, implying an indexation 
of  nominal  wages  on  consumer  price  inflation,  should  thus  not  take  place  according  to  this  pact.  As Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 5 
 
previous  studies  have  shown,  nominal  wage-setting  arrangements  at  the  national  levels  in  European 
countries not only follow labour productivity, they also depend on domestic price developments and the 
state of the economy. Apart from prices, also unemployment has been a significant determinant of wages 
in the past. 
The main aim of this study is to analyse to what extent other factors than productivity growth determined 
wage growth in the recent past. In order to put the role of labour productivity in the wage settlement 
process in perspective, we study the determinants of wage developments at the national level for some 
European  countries  over  the  three  decades,  from  1980  to  2010.  For  this  purpose,  we  use  a  wage 
bargaining model that takes into account the relevant determinants and that has a rather unique feature 
in that the wage elasticities with respect to the wage determinants may vary in time. This type of model 
contrasts the commonly assumed constant elasticities (see for instance Layard et al., 1991). 
In our analyses the EU periphery countries Greece, Ireland and Spain are included, as well as Germany, 
being  the  EU  economy  that  faced  remarkably  high  current  account  surpluses  even  during  the  recent 
economic and financial crisis (see Boysen-Hogrefe et al., 2010). Apart from these four European countries, 
the US is included in the analyses, as it is the largest economy worldwide and the main trading partner of 
the EU.  
We use a non-linear wage equation that determines the model equilibrium following from a theoretical 
wage bargaining model introduced by Graafland and Huizinga (1999) and investigated before by Peeters 
and  Den  Reijer  (2003,  2008).  The  non-linear  nature  of  the  wage  equation  enables  us  to  compute 
unemployment elasticities that can vary over time. Moreover, we quantify the time-varying contributions 
of the different determinants to the wage increase over the sample period of almost thirty years. We are 
interested in the determinants that turn out to be dominant during different decades for the different 
countries.  In  addition  to  long-term  flexibility,  we  are  also  interested  in  short-term  impulse  response 
dynamics to examine differences among the countries.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides more background information and stylised facts. 
Section  3  presents  the  theoretical  model  and  the  non-linear  wage  equation.  Section  4  reports  the 
econometric estimates of the wage equation for each of the countries. Using these results, we compute the 
labour  productivity,  price  and  unemployment  elasticities  and  contributions  of  the  determinants  with 
respect to the wage formation. Section 5 examines the downward rigidity of wages. It analyses the recent 
developments in productivity in combination with price and unemployment developments, along with the 
degree of nominal wage flexibility in the countries under investigation. Section 6 reflects on some policy 
issues and section 7 draws the main conclusions. The appendices provide analytical derivations of the 
wage bargaining model, including the elasticities and wage contributions, and describe the time series 
used in this paper. Sections 3 and 4 are quite technical, but contain special parts for those readers that are 
not interested in technicalities but rather prefer to read the economic findings. Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 6 
 
2.  LITERATURE BACKGROUND AND STYLISED FACTS 
While the neoclassical theory assumes that the economy is self-correcting and therefore wages go down in 
case of excess labour and go up in case of labour shortages, the Keynesian theory is more applicable to the 
current state of wage setting, especially in developed economies with strong labour unions. As Keynes 
described in The General Theory on Employment, Interest and Money, workers and unions tend to fight 
tooth-and-nail against any attempts by employers to reduce money wages (Keynes, 1936). The duration of 
these fights makes that the rigidity or stickiness of wages holds in the short run and for some countries 
even in the long run. 
Wages are prevalently downward sticky in developed economies, as upwardly adjustments in wages have 
taken place usually in the course of history, at least in nominal terms. From the theory thus follows that 
there is an asymmetry in the reaction of wages to the unemployment rate. For this reason, we adapt in this 
study a non-linear econometric model to explain wages that allows for accounting this asymmetry. 
We specify a two-player bargain between a representative employer and a representative employee about 
the gross wage in a Nash bargaining model. Graafland and Huizinga (1999) introduced this model and 
applied it empirically to the Netherlands. Peeters and Den Reijer (2001) adjusted it and analysed the 
effects on wages of the remarkably sharp reduction in unemployment in Ireland, in the Netherlands and in 
Spain at the  end of the  1990s. Peeters and Den Reijer (2008) applied the  model later to the French, 
German,  Spanish,  Dutch  and  US  labour  market  for  the  period  1970-2001.  Although  prices  mainly 
determined wage growth in the 1970s and 1980s, also labour productivity contributed largely to wage 
growth in Germany and the United States. In the United States, productivity contributed most to wage 
growth in the 1990s. In the course of the 1990s up until 2001, the sharp decline of unemployment was the 
main determinant of wage growth, in particular in Spain. 
 
We now show some stylised facts for the countries under investigation here and focus first on unit labour 
costs. The period considered is the decade 1975-2010 where we mainly focus on the last decade. For 
Germany, that was often mentioned and praised for its relatively moderated wage development (see for 
instance Boysen-Hogrefe, 2010, or De Grauwe, 2011), unit labour costs were low in comparison with the 
periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  
 
Figure 1 corroborates this. Growth of unit labour costs was on average 0.3% in Germany in the period 
2000-08, while this was at least eight times higher in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The US is an 
intermediate case, as unit labour costs grew on average 2.1%. In Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, unit 
labour  cost  fell  sharply  in  2009-2010  due  to  the  sovereign  debt  or  banking  crisis  in  their  domestic 
economies. In sharp contrast, a strong acceleration  in economic growth  entailed a strong rise in unit 
labour costs in German. The difference between Germany and the others is significant. 
 Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 7 
 
As  the  growth  in  unit  labour  costs  equals,  by  approximation,  the  nominal  wage  growth  minus  the 
productivity growth, we disentangle it. Figure 2 shows the results. For illustration purposes, the global 
recession year 2009 is not included as it was exceptional. Nor is the year 2010 included as this was again a 
recession year for the periphery countries. The figure corroborates once more that Germany differs from 
the others. It not only follows that German productivity grew faster than German wages in several years 
during the period 2000-08, but also that productivity growth and wage growth were in a much smaller 
range in comparison with the other countries.  Other than these more “volatile” outcomes  for  Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, relevant to our analyses is the fact that most data points are far from the 45° 
line in the graph. In Greece, Ireland and Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain, wage growth in several 
years remained very high while productivity growth was relatively low. Greece and Ireland recorded even 
wage growth of more than 9% while productivity growth was only 2-3%. 
 
However, having written this, we underline that these are only correlation analyses. We now turn to our 
wage bargaining model with the aim to estimate causal relationships running from productivity and other 
factors to wage growth. 4 This enables us to compute wage elasticities and therewith wage contributions, 
aiming for insights in the driving forces underlying the wage growth. It will further reveal differences 
across countries. 
 
   
                                                                 
4 Another interesting avenue is the causal relationship from productivity to wages. Several theories argue 
that  higher  wages  push  up  labour  productivity,  while  others  argue  that  high  wage  depress  labour 
productivity (see Caballero and Hammour (1996), Fase and Tieman (2001) and Kleinknecht (2003)). It is 
however beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this further, as our main aim is to investigate the 
policy suggestions laid down in the introduction and understand the wage growth. Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 8 
 
Figure 1  Unit labour costs 1975-2010 
in annual growth rates, % 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the KLEM European Commission and OECD databases, see appendix B. 
Note: The unit labour cost is the gross hourly wage rate of the whole economy, in euros for Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain and in US dollar for the US, divided by the production per hour. The 
percentages mentioned for the period 2000-08 are simple averages.  
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Figure 2  Wage growth in relation to labour productivity growth 2000-2008 
annual % 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the KLEM European Commission and OECD databases, see appendix B. 
Note: Productivity is measured as real GDP per capita. Data points above the 45° line correspond with a 
gross hourly wage rate that is higher than the productivity growth.   
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3.  WAGE BARGAINING MODEL 
This section describes the specifications of the two-player bargain between a representative employer 
and a representative employee about the gross wage in mathematical terms. We start from a profit and a 
utility maximising function and derive first order conditions that render a wage equation dependent on 
several factors.  
 
In case you are, as a reader, not interested in the technical details of the econometric model as laid down 
in the subsection  below, you can skip it without loss of economic information. Instead, you can  read 
subsection  2.2  that  contains  an  economic  description  of the  relationships  assumed  in  this  study  that 
should be self-explanatory. 
 
i.  The wage bargaining model in formulas 
 
The  optimal  gross  wage  of  an  employee  is  the  wage  that  maximises  the  combined  objectives  of  the 
employer and the employee. It is specified as 
 
                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where  Π  is  the  profit  function  of  the  employer  and  Ψ  the  utility  function  of  the  employee  and   a 
parameter representing the bargaining power. This bargaining parameter is ranged between 0 and 1; the 
closer it is to 0 the employee has almost full power and the employer almost none during the negotiation 
process, while a value close to 1 indicates the opposite where the employee hardly has power and the 
employer almost all.5 
 
We define profits as  net revenues  minus  labour  costs.  Gross revenues  equal the price ( P)  times  the 
number of products sold. The price is exogenous. Net revenues, that is gross revenues minus value added 
taxes and capital costs (interest, depreciation) equal    with   a parameter that we will estimate. The 
number of goods sold differs from the production by the change in inventories. Costs only consist of wage 
costs that equal the gross wage per employee W times the number of hours worked L. The specification of 
profits per labour hour is therefore  
 
                                                                                        (2) 
where sales per hour equals    with q being labour productivity. In case      , production equals sales. In 
case      ,  labour  productivity  does  not  fully  translate  into  an  equal  increase  in  sales  (cf.  Bell  et al., 
                                                                 
5 We interpret this negotiation power also as the value the employer or employee attaches to profits and 
utility, respectively (see also Figure 3). Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 11 
 
2000).6 A part of the inventory of goods is devalued or never sold, such as for instance often happens with 
perishable food products or out-of-date computers or cell phones. The producer price P is exogenous and 
we allow parameter   to deviate from 1. It may also occur that prices do not play a role in the wage 
determining process, in which case      .7 The representative employer´s aim in (2) is the maximisation 
of  profits  per  employee  Π,  by  adjusting  labour  input.  A  precondition  of  the  maximisation  is  that  the 
objective function is concave in W. We come back to this issue in the empirical analyses. 
The employee bargains about the nominal net wage, which consists of the gross wage after deduction of 
taxes and social contributions, t, and considers this in deviation of the reservation wage represented as 
            : 
 
Ψ                                                                                       (3) 
 
We distinguish an official and an informal sector in the economy. In the official sector people work and 
earn  an  official  wage          .  People  in  the  informal  sector  have  an  informal  “opportunity”  wage, 
         . The reservation  wage, as  mentioned in (3),  represents the  employee’s outside  opportunity 
wage or benefit that we define as a weighted average of this official and informal wage, 
 
                                             .                                           (4) 
 
The wage in the official sector equals the after-tax gross average market wage          in case of the 
absence  of  unemployment  ,  which  implies  that      .  As  another  extreme  case,  in  the  case  of  full 
unemployment  (     )  the  official  gross  wage  equals  the  unemployment  benefit,  which  equals  the 
replacement  rate  R  times  the  gross  wage  as,      ,.  the  replacement  rate  equals  the  average 
unemployment  benefit divided by the average gross  market wage (         ). In sum,  we have thus 
defined the official wage as  
 
            u R                                                                                (5) 
 
The wage obtained in the informal sector depends on the household production function: 
 
                                                                 
6 In the original wage bargaining model of Graafland and Huizinga (1999) but also in Peeters and Den 
Reijer (2001) constant returns to scale were assumed, implying that        Empirically, this restriction 
was later rejected for all countries under investigation (see Peeters and Den Reijer, 2008), for which 
reason we introduced the flexibility that   can deviate from 1. This parameter could even exceed 1, as 
argued by some referees, in which case the optimization of the wage bargaining model would fail due to 
non-convexity of the objective function. However, yet, we have never found any empirical evidence for 
this in countries that we analyse (see also our empirical analyses in section 4 here). 
7 This model encompasses the case where prices will not affect wages i.e.      , see also equation (7).  Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 12 
 
                
       .                                                                          (6) 
 
The employee addresses in this case his labour productivity to work at home. He avoids expenditures such 
as the costs of childcare, home cleaning or house maintenance. The informal wage therefore depends on 
the consumer price Pc. Parameter υ determines to what extent taxes, insurances and possible capital costs 
have to be paid (0       ) while parameter μ determines to what extent there is a difference between the 
labour input for household production and the eventual usable production (0       ). Parameter   takes 
account of a possible lower labour productivity of the informal vis-à-vis the official sector (0       ). In 
the case where the employee is non-productive at home, that is      , no wage is earned in the informal 
sector and therefore   in (4) should logically equal 1. 
 
Optimising the profits and utility functions simultaneously, as follows from Appendix A, the optimal wage 
results as, 
 
                                 
          
     
 
   
     
         
  
        
 
     
                         
(7) 
With 
α =parameter indicating the negotiation power of the employer in comparison with the negotiation power of 
the employee, larger than 0 (employee full power) and lower or equal to 1 (employer full power), 
β=parameter  indicating  to  what  extent  the  reservation  wage  equals  the  official wage  in  relation  to  the 
informal wage, larger than 0 (reservation wage not dependent on official wage) and less than or equal to 1 
(reservation wage only depends on official wage)  
γ=parameter indicating the degree of productivity in the informal versus the market sector, larger than 0 
(informal sector does not matter) and lower or equal to 1 (informal sector matters a lot) 
 =parameter indicating the impact of labour productivity on the wage rate, larger than 0 (no feed-through) 
and lower or equal to 1 (full feed-through), 
 =parameter indicating the degree of the price feed-through in wages, giving full price compensation in 
wages if equal to 1. 
Ψ=utility function of the employee, 
Π=profit function of the employer, 
 =combined profit and utility function, 
P=price of produced products set by employer, 
   =consumer price, 
q=labour productivity, defined as the production in volumes divided by the number of employees, 
R=replacement rate, defined as the average unemployment benefit divided by the average market, wage, 
larger than 0 and lower or equal to 1, 
u=unemployment rate, larger than 0 and lower or equal to 1, 
W=gross average wage before taxes, 
         =wage in the informal sector, 
          =wage in the official sector, 
            =reservation wage of the employee. Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 13 
 
In case of wage coordination, implying alignment of wage and productivity growth as discussed in our 
introduction  in  this  paper,  parameter   is  crucial8.  Ideally, it should not exceed one   and it should be 
positive  and  significant,  entailing  that  decreases  in  productivity  depress  wage s  and  increases  in 
productivity push wages upward. Moreover, according to the Euro-Plus Pact it should hold that  
                                                                                              (7*) 
where           is the unit labour cost. Perfect alignment of wage growth  with  productivity growth 
occurs if and only if      . It implies that there are no other explanatory factors in the wage equation (7). 
This situation will only occur if the negotiation power of the employer is weak (     ), so that neither 
unemployment nor the replacement rate plays a role and price compensation does not take place (   
 ).9  
 
Figure 3 Negotiation power and employee’s preference parameter  
Vertical axis represents         
      
      , see the third term in equation (7) 
 
Source: Authors based on the wage bargaining model, see equation (7). 
Note: We illustrate the interaction of the negotiation power of the employer versus the negotiation power 
of the employee, that is   versus (      , and the preference parameter of the employee for working in the 
official  sector  (   versus  working  in  the  informal  sector  (      .  The  left  graph  shows  that  a  higher 
preference  for  working  in  the  informal  sector  pushes  wages  up at  a  given  negotiation  power, ceteris 
paribus, because a lower   increases the term        
      
       which is represented at the vertical axis 
and equivalent to the third term in wage equation (7). The right graph shows that at a given preference of 
the employee, ceteris paribus, a lower value attached to profits by the employer pushes wages less up than 
a higher value. In this case unemployment and the replacement rate depress wages less, as follows from 
the fourth term in wage equation (7) that also contains the factor 
 
   . Interesting is further the fact that a 
small   drives up wages fast as the employee’s preference for working in the informal sector weakens the 
power of the employer, who therefore has to pay a higher wage. In contrast, if   is close to one, there is 
hardly a difference in wage increases between a low or a high negotiation power of the employer (        
or        ), respectively. 
                                                                 
8 In the literature more definitions of wage coordination are around, see Acocella and Bartolomeo (2004) 
or Stockhammer (2008), but we stick strictly to the one specified in equation (7*) with      . 
9  In the case of no negotiating power for the employer, implying       , the profit function plays no role 
and the utility function is linear. Therefore the after tax wage of the employee can be unlimited. 
0
1
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0
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The non-linearity of the wage equation (7) allows for non-constant semi-elasticities with respect to the 
unemployment  rate  u  and  the  replacement  rate  R.  This  implies  that  a  wage  change  in  response  to  a 
decrease in the unemployment rate of 1%-point may differ from a wage change in response to an increase 
in the unemployment rate of 1%-point, apart from the change in sign. As follows from equation (7), the 
semi-elasticity  with  respect  to  the  unemployment  rate  is  negative.  Therefore,  as  expected,  a  higher 
unemployment negatively affects wage growth and lower unemployment positively affects wage growth 
(see equation (A6) in appendix A for the derivation). The extent to which unemployment affects the wage 
growth  depends  on  the  replacement  rate  (R)  and  the  level  of  unemployment  (u).  Ceteris paribus,  an 
increase in unemployment depresses the wage growth more in case of sober unemployment benefits (R is 
small) than abundant unemployment benefits (R closer to 1). The unemployment elasticity is close to zero 
in case the replacement rate is close to one. Moreover, the wage elasticity of unemployment is lower if the 
level of unemployment is higher, implying a lower degree of wage flexibility (see also Folmer, 2009). In 
sum, wages are more flexibly reacting to changes in unemployment in case of a less generous welfare state 
of the economy or a tighter labour market. We come back to this feature of the model when we discuss the 
downward wage rigidities (section 5). 
 
While the wage bargaining equation (7) represents a long-term model equilibrium, our empirical analyses 
will include also short-term dynamics as the gross wage may deviate from the equilibrium wage in the 
short term. In the empirical analyses, we therefore estimate Error Correction Model (ECM) specified as  
                      
                 
                
    
            (8) 
where       equals  the  non-linear  equilibrium  (7)  at  time  t-1  and                     .  We  call  the 
parameters  ,  ,   and  the deep parameters, that we aim to estimate in the empirical analyses, along 
with the adjustment speed parameter   and the short-term effects   ’s. The other determinants in the 
wage equation, that is the producer price P, the consumer price    , the productivity q, the tax rate t, the 
unemployment rate u and the replacement rate R are known at the national level in the form of time 
series. 
In the empirical analyses, we also provide the contributions of these determinants to the wage growth. 
Based on the wage equation (7), we quantify the long-run model contributions of all determinants to the 
gross wage growth in those analyses, 
              
   
                    
 
 
where the elasticity of a determinant   is defined as 
    
       
       
 
                        (9) 
or similarly, the multiplication by     instead of 
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ii.  An economic interpretation of the wage bargaining model 
The wage bargaining model assumes that there is a representative employer that maximises profits and a 
representative employee that maximises its after tax wage. From the optimisation process, there results a 
wage rate that is the most optimal from the viewpoints of the employer and the employee. We present the 
parameter  estimates  of  this  wage  equation  at  the  national  levels,  which  enables  us  to  calculate  the 
contributions of productivity, unemployment and price to wage growth as presented in section 4. 
A special feature of our model is that the labour productivity does not necessarily feed fully into the wage, 
implying that a 1% increase in labour productivity can lead to an increase in the wage of less than 1%. 
Unlike other studies in the literature, we test for the degree of labour productivity feed-through. The same 
holds for price compensation. Wage growth does not necessarily compensate price inflation. Further to 
this, we take into account that an employee has an alternative opportunity than working in the official 
labour market. The employee can choose between taking part in the labour market and earning the official 
wage and working in the informal labour market. The latter makes the model more complete than most 
other  labour  market  models,  as  there  are  five  main  determinants  of  wages:  labour  productivity,  the 
consumer price, the unemployment rate, the replacement rate and the average tax rate. 
Another special feature of the model is the role of the discrepancy between the official wage and the 
unemployment benefit. The replacement rate, defined as the ratio of the unemployment benefit and the 
official wage, plays this role. It has some intuitive implications. A decrease in the replacement rate will 
depress wage growth. It is thus an interesting policy variable. In times of a tight labour market, policy 
makers can reduce the unemployment benefit so that the difference of the unemployment benefit and the 
official market wage widens, in order to moderate wages. 
Unlike most other models in the literature, we model wage flexibility explicitly. This makes the analyses 
more realistic, as the wage contributions of productivity growth, unemployment and price inflation may 
vary over time in accordance with the real world. Productivity growth and inflation do not have to feed 
fully into wages. Unemployment reductions can push wages more easily up than unemployment increases 
depress wages. Rigidities in wages can thus turn out to be stronger down- than upwardly.10  
4.  ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This section presents the estimation results of the wage bargaining model for Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Spain and the United States in subsection 4.i. However, readers not interested in the technical details can 
skip subsection 4.i and go to subsection 4.ii. This subsection presents the contributions of productivity, 
prices and unemployment to wages. 
                                                                 
10 Vice versa, upward wage rigidities could be stronger than downward wage rigidities. The probability 
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i.  The estimation strategy, parameter estimates and robustness test statistics 
We estimate the model with annual data. The variables represent the whole economy. The sample period 
is  1980-2010  for  Germany  and  the  United  States.  Although  we  have  a  longer  full  database  for  these 
countries, we prefer to align the samples and not to include the 1970s that were characterised by two oil 
crises en hence a high inflation period. Moreover, in view of the democratic developments in the other 
countries we stick to the period 1980-2010 or the longest times series available thereafter. In addition, as 
no  consistent  up-to-date  information  on  wages  is  available  for  Greece  for  the  years  2009-10,  we 
extrapolated these series.11  
We estimate the wage equation as specified in equation (8), by means of 2-Stage-Least-Squares (2-SLS). In 
order to correct for endogeneity between the gross wage and the price variables P and Pc, we employ the 
instrument variable estimator. The instruments are the three and four year lagged exogenous variables. 
We follow Peeters and Den Reijer (2008), but have generalised the model by the introduction of three 
additional parameters. The non-linearity and thus interrelation of parameters has therefore become more 
complicated. Table 1 reports the estimation results. 
Before discussing the estimation results, we describe the road followed for obtaining starting values for 
the structural or deep parameters in the estimation strategy. These parameters, being the employer-to-
employee’s negotiating power  , the degree of the weight of the official wage in the reservation wage  , 
the degree of productivity of the informal sector relative to the official sector  , the degree of productivity 
feed-through   and  the  degree  of  producer  prices  feed-through  ,  the  degree  of  productivity  in  the 
informal sector   and the consumer price feed through parameter  . We impose all non-linear restrictions 
according to (7) in the long-run relationship for each of the countries. However, we need suitable starting 
values for these seven parameters, as the high degree of non-linearity of these parameters can trap us into 
a local optimum.  
 
For this reason, we search the full grid of possible combinations of         and υ making steps of 0.01, 
starting at 0.00 and ending at 1.00  In theory, these parameters should be in this range. We perform the 
search on the full grid for the maximum value of the objective function for each of the six equations. The 
productivity parameter and producer price parameter in the long run (   ), the adjustment parameter 
( ) and the short run parameters (    for the first lag of wages, productivity, prices, unemployment and 
the  replacement  rate are estimated freely, if possible  . For  each combination  on  this grid the sum  of 
squared  residuals  (ssr)  is  calculated.  After  searching  the  full  grid,  we  use  the  combination  of  these 
parameters that provides the smallest SSR, along with the associated estimated other parameters, as the 
starting values in the estimation of the system of equations by 2-SLS. Table 1 presents our results. 
 
                                                                 
11 See appendix A of a description of the database of time series and the previous section for graphs. Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 17 
 
Table 1  Two-Stage-Least-Squares estimation results of the wage bargaining model 
Note: These are the estimates of equation (8) with the long-run relationship as specified in equation (7). 
Instruments  used  are  three  and  four  years  lagged  exogenous  variables  (of  the  country  under 
consideration but also from Germany or the US). Q(2) is the statistic for third-order autocorrelation. The 
figures in brackets are HAC t-statistics. Insignificant parameters are set to 0 and  ’s and  ’s insignificantly 
different from 1 are imposed to be 1. A dummy for Germany is included to capture the change due to the 
unification in 1990. 
  Germany  Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain  US 
 
Long-run parameter estimates 
   0.68  0.82  0.83  0.74  0.88  0.68 
   0.84  0.89  0.77  0.85  0.89  0.89 
   0.33  0.92  0.93  0.90  0.99  0.59 
   1.00 
 
0.11 
 
1.00 
 
1.00  0  1.00 
   0.10  0.71  0.24  1.00  0.13  1.00 
   0.99  0.22  0.51  0.69  0.99  0.51 
   0.99  0.14  0.51  0.11  0.20  0.61 
   -0.20 
(-4.05) 
-0.11 
(-6.14) 
-0.07 
(-2.38) 
-0.35 
(-9.09) 
-0.06 
(-4.00) 
-0.12 
(-1.97) 
 
Short-run parameter estimates 
         0.33 
(3.59) 
  0.46 
(3.71) 
 
 
0.34 
(2.19) 
 
             0.78 
(3.42) 
   
                   0.45 
(3.70) 
          0.04 
(6.47) 
0.14 
(12.8) 
0.04 
(3.61) 
0.13 
(8.78) 
0.06 
(3.76) 
0.04 
(4.95) 
    
    0.77  0.59  0.58  0.92  0.89  0.77 
Sample period  1980-10  1988-10  1981-10  1991-10  1980-10  1980-10 
Standard 
error*100 
1.02  3.16  2.47  1.47  1.41  0.87 
p-value Q(2)  0.15  0.38  0.07  0.33  0.32  0.05 
p-value Jarque-
Bera 
0.31  0.25  0.37  0.79  0.62  0.88 
Instruments  13  13  13  13  13  13 Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 18 
 
Table  1  shows  that  adjusted  R2  varies  from  0.58  for  Ireland  to  0.92  for  Portugal.  The  adjustment 
parameters of the long-run equilibrium are all significant. Further test statistics on autocorrelation in the 
residuals (the here presented Q(2)) as well as on normality of residuals do not reject the hypothesis of 
autocorrelation and normality at the 5%-level, respectively. Therefore, the overall estimation results are 
satisfactory. The productivity parameters for Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the US were insignificantly 
different  from  1,  so  they  were  fixed  at  1.  Most  of  the  other  parameter  estimates  in  the  long  run 
relationship  differ  across  countries.  These  differences  become  more  apparent  when  studying  the 
elasticities and wage contributions, which is our next step here below. 
ii.  Wage growth decomposed into productivity, prices, unemployment and other determinants 
The contributions of the wage determinants show a number of interesting results (see Figure 4). While the 
beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, like the 1990s, was marked by much lower inflation than 
the 1980s, inflation was in most countries still a main contributor to wage growth. Apart from prices, the 
reduction in unemployment however pushed up wages until the global recession started. In Germany, 
Portugal, the United States, and in particular in Spain, unemployment played a major role in the wage 
formation processes. For Germany, Ireland, Spain and the US these results corroborate earlier findings 
(see also Peeters and Den Reijer (2003, 2008).  
Our focus is however on productivity. As the Figure shows, this played a prominent role in Germany, 
Ireland, Portugal and the United States. Interesting is in this respect the case of Ireland. While productivity 
growth  contributed  positively  to  wage  growth  in  most  years,  apart  from  the  recession,  other  factors 
(prices, unemployment) drove wage growth down. Vice versa, the same holds. In years where productivity 
was low, other factors (prices, unemployment) pushed wages upward. There is however a large residual 
part that we cannot explain.  
Figure 5 illustrates the relative impact of productivity, unemployment, prices and other factors. It follows 
that productivity explains wage growth for 40% in the period 1998-2010. Germany ranks highest in this 
respect. In Ireland and the US productivity only explained 32 and 28% of wage growth, respectively, while 
this  was  much  less  for  Portugal  (18%),  Spain  (8%)  and  Greece  (5%).  Developments  in  German 
productivity  thus  significantly  and  largely  influenced  German  wages.  Nonetheless,  developments  in 
unemployment and prices counted in this period for 19 and 12%. The remainder of 30% is unexplained. 
As follows further, in Spain the main wage determinant was unemployment (even at 42%). Prices counted 
most in Portugal, Greece and also the US, for more than 35%.  
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Figure 4 Contributions to wage growth based on the wage bargaining model 
in percentages 
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Continued from previous page 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the econometrically estimated wage bargaining model (see Table 1). 
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Figure 5 Explanatory power of productivity, prices and unemployment 
in percentages of total wage growth 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: For each country and each year we calculated the absolute value of the contribution of productivity 
(see figure 4) as a percentage of the sum of the absolute value of the contributions of productivity, of 
prices,  of  unemployment  and  of  the  residual.  We  calculate  the  latter  as  the  wage  growth  minus  the 
contributions  of  productivity,  prices,  and  unemployment.  This  graph  illustrates  the  simple  averages 
during the 13 years periods mentioned (from 1998-2010 and 1985-1997). 
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5.  LOW PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITIES 
High wage growth accompanied with low productivity growth, and consequently high unit labour costs, 
triggered the policy discussion about wages, as referred to in the introduction of this paper. To investigate 
this further, this section focuses on years where low productivity growth did not drive wage growth down 
in  each  of  the  countries  under  investigation.  We  are  interested  to  find  out  what  was  hampering  the 
flexibility of wage growth to adjust downwardly. 
As the results in the previous section showed, prices and unemployment are important determinants in 
the wage formation. These factors may have been driving up wages in times of low productivity growth. 
Positive inflation and low  unemployment tend to push up  wages.  High inflation  and low productivity 
occurred occasionally in Germany, Portugal, Greece and Ireland in the decade 2000-10. From the data also 
follows that Germany, Portugal, and Greece ran into situations where productivity growth fell below zero, 
while unemployment decreased which may have put upward pressure on wages. 
The extent to which price inflation and the change in unemployment put upward pressure on wages in 
times of low productivity growth depends on their wage elasticities. We therefore investigate, based on 
the elasticities computed from the estimated wage bargaining model, the distributions of the contributions 
of prices and unemployment to wage growth considering the whole sample period. Figure 6 presents the 
results. It marks the situations where wage growth did not exceed productivity growth by white parts. All 
other cases are of interest to us here, as wage growth was too high in comparison with labour productivity 
(not in agreement with the Euro-Plus Pact). The distribution is in frequencies, so for Spain for instance, 
there were twelve years in which wages dropped more than 1% due to unemployment and there were 
thirteen years in which unemployment pushed up wages by more than 1%. 
The figure shows that the distribution of the contribution of prices is skewed to the left (implying peaks to 
the right) in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the US. In many years, inflation pushed up 
wages more than 1 percent. For the Greece, Ireland, Portugal (apart from one year), Spain and Germany, 
there are no downward adjustments in wages due to prices, pointing at downward price rigidities. In 
contrast,  the  distribution  of  the  unemployment  contributions  is  more  symmetric,  implying  that 
unemployment not only pushed wages upward but also downward. The degree of flexibility of wages to 
changes in unemployment was thus relatively high.  
We draw two lessons here. First, both prices and unemployment have been driving up wages in times of 
low  productivity  and  prices  did  this  even  more  often  than  unemployment.  Second,  downward  price 
rigidities exist in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain but also in Germany. Especially in Greece, apart from 
some rare exceptions, wages even only moved upwardly. This downward rigidity of wages is thus likely to 
hamper swift falls in wages, also in times of low productivity.  
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Figure 6 Distribution of wage contributions of prices and unemployment 
frequencies counting the number of years 
 
Source: Own calculations based on wage contributions.  
Note: White cases mark where wage growth did not exceed productivity growth and consequently unit 
labour costs fell. Recession years 2009-2010 are not included. 
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This downward rigidity in wages, as it concerns the wage responsiveness to changes in consumer price 
inflation and unemployment enters the wage bargaining model via the reservation wage. There is, among 
others, the sometimes highly valued informal sector or the high unemployment benefits that makes it 
unattractive  to  participate  in  the  labour  market.  A  high  reservation  wage  drives  up  wages,  as  the 
employee wants to have a higher wage to obtain enough utility (see equation (1)). At the same time, the 
employer is willing to pay this wage, in particular when the labour market is tight, or consumer prices or 
replacement rates are high (as follows from equation (7)).  
Oppositely, a reduction of the reservation wage moderates wage growth. A direct policy instrument to 
influence the reservation wage is the unemployment benefit, being the nominator of the replacement rate 
(while the wage is the denominator, see equation (5)). A widening of the gap between the unemployment 
benefit and the wage rate brings the replacement rate and therewith the reservation wage down as it 
becomes less financially beneficial to remain unemployed.  
While the growth rate of the reservation wage has been lagging somewhat behind the growth rate of the 
wages during the decade 2000-2007 in Ireland, Portugal and the US, it has kept good pace with the wage 
growth (see Table 2). Irish reservation wages grew 5.8%, only 0.4%-points lower than wages. In the other 
countries, the reservation wage has followed the wage growth even more closely. In Greece and Spain, the 
reservation wage grew as fast as wages (with 7.4 and 3.2%-points, respectively).  
The role of the reservation wage is in this respect interesting, in particular for Portugal and Spain, but also 
Ireland, as these economies record the highest replacement rates (at 41.1, 36.1 and 33.0%, see Table 2) of 
this group of economies. In Portugal and Ireland, the reservation wage has even increased 5%-points in 
comparison with a decade ago. This contrast sharply with other countries, such as Germany and Greece as 
they have brought their replacement rates down during this period. 
To explain this feature of the model, we analyse the impact of a 5%-point reduction of the reservation 
wage on wages with our estimated wage bargaining model (see Table 1). We do this for each of our 
countries in order to be able to make a comparison of the effects. Figure 7 shows the result. It follows that 
the impact across the countries varies from a decrease in wages of 0.5% to even 1.5% in the longer run. 
For Portugal and Ireland, for instance, their wages would have been 0.5% lower in case they would have 
had replacement rates of 31.1 and 28%, respectively. This effect would already have materialised in 5 
years. The effects for Spain are much bigger. Already in 5 years, wages would have been 0.8% lower than 
in  the  baseline  and  after  10  years  even  1.5%.  The  reason  that  the  same  policy  measure  works  out 
differently for the economies comes from the non-linear character of the wage equation that we use and 
the differences in the estimated employees’ preference parameters (see (7)). Lowering the unemployment 
benefits in a country with a relatively high unemployment, as in Spain, depresses wages more than other 
countries.  Spain  recorded  12.1%  unemployment  in  2000-10,  while  Portugal  and  Ireland  recorded 
respectively  7.4%  and  6.3%  in  this  period.  Reducing  replacement  rate  is  thus  an  effective  means  for 
moderating wages and it can help counteracting the upward wage pressure from other determinants.  
 Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 25 
 
Table 2   Actual replacement and unemployment rates 1981-2010 
   Germany  Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain  US 
Wage growth and reservation wage growth 2000-2008             
after tax wage  (W*(1-t))  1.9  7.4  6.4  3.7  3.2  4.3 
reservation wage (Wreservation)  2.1  7.4  5.8  3.2  3.2  4.0 
difference  -0.2  0.0  0.6  0.5  0.0  0.3 
Average actual replacement rate, in percentages                
1981-90  23.6  5.7  24.3  16.7  26.3  11.0 
1991-00  27.1  14.6  28.9  36.9  36.1  12.5 
2001-07  26.6  13.0  33.0  41.1  36.1  13.6 
Average actual unemployment, in percentages                
1981-90  7.1  7.1  14.6  7.3  18.3  7.1 
1991-00  8.1  10.1  11.2  5.5  19.5  5.6 
2001-10  8.8  9.8  6.3  7.4  12.0  6.1 
Source: Own calculations and OECD, see appendix B. 
Note:  We  calculate  the  reservation  wage  according  to  equation  (4),  where  we  use  the  estimated 
parameters  ,     and υ as reported in Table 1. The reported figures are simple averages of the annual 
growth rates. 
 
 
Figure 7 Wage responses to 5%-point lower replacement rates according to the ECM 
percentage deviation from the baseline 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the wage bargaining model estimates of Table 1. 
Note: At time 0 the replacement rate decreases 5%-points in comparison with the baseline in each country 
and is kept at that level for the rest of the period (20 years) and the figure presents the wage response 
according to the Error-Correction-Model equation (8). 
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Table 3 Long-term wage response to productivity, prices, unemployment and the replacement rate 
percentage deviation from the baseline 
   Germany  Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain  US 
decrease in productivity of 1%                
minimum  -1.00  -0.14  -0.71  -0.87  -0.47  -0.90 
maximum  -1.00  -0.16  -0.74  -0.93  -0.59  -0.93 
decrease in prices of 1%                   
minimum  -0.24  -0.45  -0.39  -0.62  -0.16  -0.92 
maximum  -0.29  -0.56  -0.40  -0.80  -0.17  -0.94 
increase in unemployment by 1%-point                
minimum  -0.87  -1.76  -0.97  -0.87  -1.46  -1.18 
maximum  -0.95  -2.11  -1.19  -1.13  -1.94  -1.27 
decrease in replacement rate by 5%-points                
minimum  -0.35  -0.81  -0.33  -0.33  -1.26  -0.29 
maximum  -0.66  -1.31  -1.23  -0.84  -2.79  -0.65 
Source: Own calculations based on the estimated wage bargaining model (see Table 1). 
Note:  These  estimates  are  the  minimum  and  maximum  of  the  computed  elasticities  over  the  sample 
periods 1980-2010. 
 
 
Table 3 presents the long-term wage effects of a 5% decrease in the replacement rate (see last lines) along 
with the effect on wages of changes in productivity, prices and unemployment. We present the minimum 
and maximum of the sample period as these elasticities vary due to the non-linear character of the model. 
As  follows,  the  range  between  the  minimum  and  maximum  is  sometimes  quite  big.  For  instance,  a 
decrease of 5%-points in the replacement rate for Portugal (for example from 41% to 36%, see also Table 
2) could have led to a fall in the Portuguese wage in the long-term ranging from 0.33% to 0.84%. It effect 
depends on the timing and in particular on the level of unemployment in Portugal. Comparing the sizes of 
the wage responses across the determinants shows that the replacement rate is a powerful instrument. In 
Spain, a 5% decrease in the replacement rate could have affected wages much more than a 1% decrease in 
productivity, a 1% decrease in prices and it is even larger than a 1%-point increase in unemployment.  
 
In case we assume that the future wage formation in these countries continues as it happened in the past, 
these estimated long-term wage responses can be used for taking measures in current and future policy 
making. 
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6.  A POLICY REFLECTION 
Most economists and policy-makers believe that wage flexibility is key issue for Europe, especially a quick 
adjustment of wages to changes in productivity, prices and unemployment. Flexibility is assumed to allow 
for a swift recovery of the economy from negative shocks since the latter translate into lower output and 
higher unemployment. The ambition of EU policy makers to align wage and productivity growth goes 
however even further. It not only leaves aside the possible influence that the stance of the labour market 
in terms of unemployment on wages may have. It also rules out that wage indexation takes place. Ignoring 
prices  in  the  wage  bargaining  process,  implying  no  adjustment  of  wages  to  compensate  for  inflation, 
reduces the value of money over time. Abolishing indexation, however, would allow for real wages to 
decrease and thus reductions in people's purchasing power can take place. 
 
However, the high ambition of European policy makers is understandable in view of the rapidly growing 
emerging  economies outside Europe that keep the competition at the  world markets fierce. It is also 
understandable in light of the persisting fiscal problems in some EU countries and the accompanying 
current account deficits. Keeping the twin deficits of government balances and current accounts seems not 
sustainable, nor desirable. Apart from the difficulty to implement wage coordination in practice according 
to the competitivity or Euro-Plus Pact, such as enforce it on the whole economy while wage bargaining 
takes mainly place in free market economies at different bargaining levels, the results of this study show 
that in some countries wage growth is driven by prices and unemployment, rather than productivity. 
There  is  thus  a  need  for  a  different  mindset  in  the  wage  bargaining  process  and  among  workers  in 
particular. In times of low productivity growth and not-low inflation, that may easily occur, the purchasing 
power of workers risks eroding and therefore bargaining a low wage growth will become difficult. 
 
Alternatively, if productivity growth is not sufficiently high for compensating price increases, measures 
can  be  taken  to  boost  productivity.  Working  more  efficiently  and  effectively,  optimizing  the  input  of 
physical capital combined with labour, and introducing new technological developments, for instance, are 
ways to increase the production per employee or hour. It may also help to reduce the number of working 
hours but at the same time employing skilled personnel, matching jobs with the rightly skilled people, and 
flexibilisation of the labour force. Although this is beyond the scope of this paper, lessons could be learned 
from those countries that successfully innovated, stimulated and adapted their products traded at the 
world markets. They have a longer tradition in using wage moderation as a policy instrument not only for 
the public sector but also for the private sector. 
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7.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP 
In  most  developed  countries,  the  settlement  of  nominal  wages  is  a  complicated  process  that  is  not 
describable in terms of linear equations. Not only labour productivity growth determines wage growth. 
The stance of the business cycle, the negotiation power of the employees in relation to employers, fiscal 
and social security measures but also price developments play a role. This paper adopts a wage bargaining 
model,  with  the  realistic  feature  of  asymmetric  and  time-varying  elasticities  of  productivity,  prices, 
unemployment,  replacement  rates.  Based  on  its  econometric  estimates,  we  are  able  to  compute  the 
contributions of the different determinants of wages for Germany, the EU-periphery countries Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain and the United States. We cover almost the full three decades, 1980-2010 for 
most of these economies. 
 
The debt crisis in the European Monetary Union has put wage coordination among the member states 
high on the political agenda. Member states in a monetary union no longer possess the instrument of the 
exchange rate to adjust to asymmetric shocks. As the countries of the European Monetary Union trade 
more with each other than with economies outside the union, a coordination of the real exchange seems 
needed to avoid intra euro area current account imbalances. If not, a low inflation member country with a 
weak real exchange rate (e.g. Germany) builds current account surpluses with a country with a strong real 
exchange rate (e.g. Greece). As the real exchange rate only differs in the cost (price) component, being the 
unit labour costs, the EU leaders have put more  emphasis on  wage coordination. Wage coordination, 
defined here as aligning wage growth with productivity growth at the national levels, implies that unit 
labour costs remain constant. In case each member state of the monetary union sticks to this “pact”, the 
monetary union can absorb asymmetric shocks, potentially without the need to build a fiscal union.  
 
In the Euro-Plus Pact the leaders of the European Union, especially those of the euro area as they are in 
charge  of  the  European  Monetary  Union,  formulate  wage  coordination  in  a  strict  sense.  The  main 
reasoning here is thus that wage growth higher than productivity growth is bad for the competitiveness of 
the position at the export markets. It implies that unit labour costs are rising and consequently export 
products and services become too expensive in comparison with those from other countries or continents. 
As a result, current account balances turn (more) negative and this will not help the countries’ public 
finances. However, vice versa, also countries with decreasing unit labour costs should stick to the pact.  
 
We derive three main conclusions from our analyses in this study.  
 
1.  Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are far from aligning wage growth with productivity growth. 
Although productivity played a role in their wage formation during the period 1998-2010, also 
prices  and  unemployment  put  upward  pressure  on  wages  (see  Figures  4  and  5).  Prices  and 
unemployment  played  even  a  more  dominant  role  than  productivity  in  Greece,  Portugal  and 
Spain. Unemployment was most dominant in Spain (by 40%) and prices in Greece and Portugal Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 29 
 
(by around 35%). Increases in unemployment that put upward pressure on wages, and price 
inflation  kept  wage  growth  high,  also  in  times  of  low  productivity.  While  increases  in 
unemployment sometimes pushed wages down, this hardly ever occurred for prices. Therefore, 
downward wage rigidities hampered wages from being moderated (Figure 6).  
2.  In Germany, also other factors than those that we have explicitly modelled here, must have been 
depressing  German  wages.  While  wage  and  productivity  growth  seemed  indeed  aligned  in 
Germany in the years 2000-2008, and unit labour costs even slightly declined (see our Figures 1 
and 2), prices and unemployment still determined wages by 31% (see Figure 4). Productivity 
growth contributed 40% to wage growth. On top of this, there is a large unexplained part of 30%, 
indicating that fiscal and other factors also played a role in the settlement of wage growth. As 
earlier  results  have  indicated,  a  shift  in  determinants  from  inflation  in  the  1970s  towards 
unemployment  and  productivity  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  has  taken  place  but  neither  price 
inflation nor unemployment are negligible in wage setting (see also Peeters and Den Reijer, 2008, 
and Figures 4 and 5 in this paper). 
3.  Lower  reservation  wages  moderate  wages  and  higher  reservation  wages  push  up  wages.  The 
replacement  rate  is  a  main  determinant  of  the  reservation  wages.  As  the  replacement  rate 
interacts with unemployment and the preference parameters of the employee between working 
in the official or informal sector, economies with high unemployment and with a main preference 
of employees for the official sector can most effectively moderate wages by widening the gap 
between unemployment benefits and wages (see Figure 7 and equation (A7)). In other words, 
lowering unemployment benefits moderates wage growth more if unemployment is high  (  is 
high) or if working in the informal sector is unattractive (  is high).  
 
Apart  from  the  macro  evidence  that  we  provide  in  this  study,  an  interesting  and  relevant  avenue  of 
research  seems  the  move  towards  a  more  sector  level  distinguishing  between  the  public  and  private 
sector primarily. Wage setting in the public sector is in many developed economies also a bargaining 
process,  though  differs  in  negotiation  power  from  the  private  sector.  In  times  of  implementation  of 
reforms in the public sector, the public sector wage gets under pressure. Econometric models may have to 
adjust  to capture  this  specific  feature,  in  particular  for  those  countries  where  the  government  sector 
employs a substantial part of the working age population. 
 
Another avenue is the research on fiscal policy on wages. Average and marginal tax rates play a role in 
wage  setting,  for  employers  and  employees.  As  this  is  an  obvious  instrument  for  the  national  policy 
makers,  studies  on  the  quantified  impact  of  taxes  on  the  wage  formation  process  in  the  individual 
countries  can  help  policy  makers  in  making  their  decisions  to  pave  the  way  to  their  national  and 
international objectives.  
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF THE WAGE EQUATION, THE WAGE ELASTICITIES AND THE WAGE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Ai) Derivation of the wage equation 
Substitution of (2) and (3) in the objective function (1) gives  
 
                                            
where      is the tax paid by the employee as a function of W, and differentiate with respect to W: 
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Substitution of (4) and (5) in (3) gives  
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Substitution of (A2) into (A1) gives 
 
    
     
      
                          
 
      
                                     
           
 
 
      
 
     
 
     
      
                               
        
     
 
   
      
      
   
 
 
                               
          
       
 
   
     
          
 
         
 
     
 
     
      
                         
 
 
This equals (7) where        is imposed.
12    
                                                                 
12   The  lack  of  consistent  time  series  on  marginal  tax  rates  across  countries  forces  us  to  make  this 
restriction. We leave analyzing the marginal and average tax impact on wages to future research.  Wage formation, wage flexibility and wage coordination  Page 31 
 
Aii) Derivation of the wage elasticities 
 
Based on the long-run wage equation the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity, producer and 
consumer prices, and the semi-elasticities of wages with respect to unemployment and the replacement 
rate are respectively as follows. 
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(A7) 
where  
   
 
                        . 
All elasticities are time varying, unless specific parameter restrictions hold. For instance, the productivity 
elasticity (A2) will be non-time varying in case      , implying that the final output of labour at work (sold 
products) is as high as the final output of labour at home. In this case: 
   
      
      
    
Price homogeneity holds in case      , implying that the costs saved by one unity of household work 
equals the price that the employer earns for one unity of products sold. In this case:  
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Aiii) Derivation of the wage contributions 
 
It holds that the differential wage equation approximates the sum of the wage contributions, that is 
 
          
     
       
   
                    
    
 
                
   
                    
 
 
where in case of semi-elasticities (for t, u and R) multiplication by     instead of 
   
  
  takes place. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the five individual contributions according to the estimated wage equations for each 
individual country in our analysis. 
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APPENDIX B.  DATA SOURCES 
 
The  time  series  used  in  our  analyses  are  annual  and  come  from  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
operation and Development (OECD, Paris, see http://stats.oecd.org) and the KLEM- and AMECO-databases 
of DG Economics and Financial Affairs (European Commission, Brussels, see http://www.euklems.net and 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco).  They  range  from  1970  to  2010  for  Germany  and  the 
United States. The data range for Greece from 1983 to 2010, for Ireland from 1977 to 2010, for Portugal 
from 1986 to 2010, for Spain from 1975 to 2010. 
 
Wages (W) are gross, per hour worked for the whole economy in the domestic currency. For the years 
1970-2007 they come from the KLEM database (variable LAB_AVG). As these series stop in 2007 (in 2006 
for Portugal), we use the gross hourly earnings growth rates of the private sector from the OECD for 
extrapolating the years up to 2010, except for Ireland and Greece. For Ireland, we use the hourly wages of 
the manufacturing sector because the private sector data are not available for these years. 
 
Remarkably, the OECD has no hourly wage data for Greece. We therefore use the best alternative, being 
the  Greek  compensation  for  the  whole  economy  from  the  AMECO  database  from  the  European 
Commission and we divide these by the number of hours worked per Greek employee.  
 
Labour productivity (q) is real growth per hour from the OECD database. We construct an index from these 
growth rates (1970=100). For those economies for which there is not yet a realisation for 2010, we use 
the projection from the Economic Outlook December 2010. The productivity series for Portugal only exists 
from 1986 onwards. 
 
Producer prices (P) are the total manufacturing producer prices for Ireland and the United States and the 
domestic manufacturing producer prices for the other countries. All these series  are part of the main 
economic indicators from the OECD. For Portugal, these only exist from 1990 onwards. We use the gross 
output price index from the KLEM database to estimate the prices for 1986-1989 for Portugal to construct 
a  longer  series.  This  hardly  affects  our  analyses  as  we  use  lags  for  the  variables  in  the  econometric 
estimations.  
 
Consumer prices (   ) come from the main economic indicators from the OECD. 
 
Unemployment  (u)  is  the  harmonised  unemployment  rate  from  the  macroeconomic  indicators  of  the 
OECD.  
 
The gross replacement rates (RPR) are two-year annual series from Benefits and wages: OECD Indicators, 
from the OECD (2007). We interpolated the data for the missing years by using the information for two 
adjacent years. For each country, we keep the rate for the years after 2008 constant at the rate of 2007. 
 
Tax and social contributions (t and tm) are annual data from 2000 onwards from the OECD, while data 
before 2000 come from EUROMON (see Demertzis et al. 2006). 
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